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Abstract
We analyze a binary prediction market in which traders have heterogeneous prior
beliefs and private information. Realistically, we assume that traders are allowed to
invest a limited amount of money (or have decreasing absolute risk aversion). We
show that the rational expectations equilibrium price underreacts to information.
When favorable information to an event is available and is revealed by the market,
the price increases and this forces optimists to reduce the number of assets they can
(or want to) buy. For the market to equilibrate, the price must increase less than a
posterior belief of an outside observer.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies the theoretical properties of prediction markets as forecasting tools.
Prediction markets are incentive-based mechanisms for obtaining forecasts about future
events. Often, prediction market forecasts are more accurate than those obtained by more
traditional methods, such as expert judgement, or opinion polls.1 Partly because of the
track record of prediction markets as forecasting tools, there is a growing interest in using
the information collected in these markets to improve decision making in business and
public policy contexts.2
In our model, individual traders have heterogeneous beliefs that originate from two
sources. First, individuals have non-common prior beliefs (or initial opinions)–these
prior beliefs are subjective and thus are uncorrelated with the realization of the outcome.
Second, individuals have access to possibly diﬀerent information about the outcome–
information has an objective nature because it is correlated with the outcome. This dis-
tinction between prior beliefs and information is standard.3
Typically, prediction markets target unique events, such as the outcome of a presidential
election, or a merger. Given that traders have limited experience with such situations, it
would be unrealistic to assume that they share a common prior belief. Instead, it is natural
to allow traders to have heterogeneous prior beliefs. For the purpose of our analysis, the
traders’ subjective prior beliefs play the role of exogenous parameters, like preferences.
Having diﬀerent prior beliefs, traders gain from betting actively against one another.
While trade in prediction markets may be motivated by the traders’ heterogeneous prior
beliefs, the designers of these markets typically are interested in extracting the information
these traders have.4 As we demonstrate in our model, the price that emerges in equilibrium
is a generalized average of the participants’ posterior beliefs–which combine their prior
beliefs with the information that is revealed through the trading process.
We focus on a simple market for a binary event, such as the outcome of a presidential
election. Traders can take positions in two Arrow-Debreu contingent assets, each paying
1See, for instance, Forsythe et al. (1992) and Berg et al. (forthcoming) on the track record of the Iowa
Electronic Markets since 1988.
2See Hanson (1999), Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004), and Hahn and Tetlock (2005).
3An individual updates her belief when learning someone else’s information. When exposed to the
prior belief of another individual, the same individual would not be led instead to revise her belief.
4As Aumann (1976) notes, “reconciling subjective probabilities makes sense if it is a question of im-
plicitly exchanging information, but not if we are talking about ‘innate’ diﬀerences in priors.”
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one dollar if the corresponding outcome is realized. In our formulation, each trader’s initial
endowment is constant with respect to the outcome realization. Taking into account a
typical institutional feature of prediction markets, we constrain the wealth each trader can
invest in the market. The prices of the assets are determined by a competitive trading
process. Given that the prices for the two assets sum to one, it is natural to interpret an
asset’s price as the probability of the corresponding event.
In our analysis, we stack the cards in favor of eﬃcient information aggregation by
positing that the market is in a fully-revealing rational expectations equilibrium (REE).
In an REE, traders make correct inferences from prices, given common knowledge of the
information structure and the prior beliefs. Because the assumption that the market
reaches a fully revealing REE is not warranted for some market rules, ours is the most
optimistic scenario for information aggregation.5
For any given realization of private information, the market price can be interpreted as
a posterior probability obtained by updating an implied market prior belief. This implied
market prior belief is a generalized average of the traders’ prior beliefs. However, we
show that this implied market prior belief depends systematically on the particular signal
realization. Hence, the incorporation of information into the market price is intertwined
with (and cannot easily be separated from) the aggregation of subjective prior beliefs.
Our main result is that the market price underreacts to pre-trade information. When
the information is more favorable to an event, resulting in a higher market price for the
corresponding asset, the implied market prior probability is lower. Equivalently, more
favorable information yields a higher market price, but the price increment is smaller than
if the market price adjusted to the information as a Bayesian posterior probability for the
event. This result provides a new explanation of the favorite-longshot bias, a regularity
that is widely documented in the empirical literature on betting markets.
To understand the logic driving this result, consider a prediction market written on
which finalist, Italy or Denmark, will win the European soccer championship. Suppose that
the risk-neutral traders are subjectively more optimistic about Italy winning, the further
South is their residence. In equilibrium, traders south of a certain threshold latitude spend
the maximum amount of money allowed to buy the Italy asset, while, conversely, traders
5See Plott and Sunder (1982 and 1988) and Forsythe and Lundholm (1990) for experimental investi-
gations of the conditions leading to REE in settings with diﬀerential private information.
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north of the threshold latitude bet all they can on Denmark.
Now consider what happens when traders overall possess more favorable information
about Italy winning before trade takes place. In the fully revealing REE, this information
will be revealed and will cause the price for the Italy asset to be higher, while contem-
poraneously reducing the price for the Denmark asset. As a result, the southern traders
(who are optimistic about Italy) are able to buy fewer Italy assets, which are now more
expensive–while the northern traders can aﬀord, and will end up demanding, more Den-
mark assets (now cheaper). Hence, there would be an excess supply of the Italy asset
and excess demand for the Denmark asset. For the market to equilibrate, some northern
traders must turn to the Italian side.
In summary, when information more favorable to an outcome is available, the marginal
trader who determines the price has a prior belief that is less favorable to that outcome.
Through this countervailing adjustment, the heterogeneity in priors will dampen the eﬀect
of information on price. While we just presented this intuitive explanation under the
assumption of risk neutrality, we also show that the result extends to the case of risk-averse
agents exhibiting decreasing absolute risk aversion, even when there is no exogenous bound
on the amount of money traders can invest.
We contribute to the asset pricing literature by generalizing Grossman’s (1976) charac-
terization of REE to allow for wealth eﬀects and heterogeneous priors. Our model’s main
ingredients (heterogeneous priors, private information, general risk preferences, and REE)
then are the same as in Milgrom and Stokey (1982). To their setting, we add the com-
parative statics of how the equilibrium resulting in the first round of trade must depend
on the information that is present in the market. Milgrom and Stokey instead focus on
the price adjustment that follows the arrival of new information in a second period, after
the first round of trade has occurred. As compared to Varian’s (1989) analysis of trade
with heterogeneous priors, we introduce here the possibility of wealth eﬀects by imposing
a limit on the amount that traders can invest and, more generally, by relaxing the constant
absolute risk aversion assumption.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces our baseline model with risk-
neutral traders. Section 3 derives the equilibrium and gives a parimutuel re-interpretation.
Section 4 demonstrates the general interdependence of information and belief aggregation
and the occurrence of the favorite-longshot bias. Section 5 extends the analysis to the case
4
with risk-averse traders. After a more detailed discussion of the paper’s contribution to
the literature in Section 6, we conclude in Section 7. All proofs are in Appendix A.
2 Baseline Model
Our model is inspired by the rules of the Iowa Electronic Markets for a binary prediction
market, in which traders can take positions on whether an event, E, is realized (e.g., the
Democratic candidate wins the 2008 presidential election) or not. There are two Arrow-
Debreu assets corresponding to the two possible realizations: one asset pays out 1 currency
unit if event E is realized and 0 otherwise, while the other asset pays out 1 currency unit
if the complementary event Ec is realized and 0 otherwise.6
Traders enter the market by first obtaining an equal number of both assets. Essentially,
the designer of the prediction market initially endows each trader i with wi0 units of each
of the two assets. One important feature of the market is that there is a limit on how
much money each trader can invest.7 After entering the market, traders can exchange
their assets with other traders. A second key feature of the market is that traders are not
allowed to hold a negative quantity of either asset. As explained below in more detail,
these two restrictions (on the amount of money invested and on the number of assets a
trader can sell) impose a bound on the number of asset units that each individual trader
can purchase and eventually hold.8
Markets clear when the aggregate demand for asset 1 precisely equals the aggregate
demand for asset 2. We normalize the sum of the two asset prices to one, and focus on
the price p of the asset paying in event E.
We assume that there is a continuum I of risk-neutral traders who aim to maximize
their subjective expected wealth. Trader i maximizes πiwi (E) + (1− πi)wi (Ec), where
πi denotes the trader’s subjective belief. We now turn to the process that determines the
trader’s subjective belief, πi.
6The state of the world is given exogenously and cannot be aﬀected by the traders. This assumption
is realistic in the case of prediction markets on economic statistics, such as non-farm payroll employment.
When applied to corporate decision making, prediction market traders might have incentives to manipulate
the outcome. Ottaviani and Sørensen (2006) analyze outcome manipulation, disregarding the wealth eﬀect
on which we concentrate in this paper.
7For example, in the Iowa Electronic Markets each trader cannot invest more than $500. Exemption
from anti-gambling legislation is granted to small stake markets created for educational purposes.
8Our main result (Proposition 2) hinges on the property that this bound is endogenous to the model,
because the number of assets each trader eventually holds depends on the market-clearing prices.
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Initially, trader i has subjective prior belief qi. Before trading, trader i privately ob-
serves signal si. Conditional on state ω ∈ {E,Ec}, we let f (s|ω) denote the joint proba-
bility density of the signal vector s = {si}i∈I .9 The likelihood ratio for signal realization
s is defined as L (s) = f (s|E) /f (s|Ec). The only constraint imposed on the signal dis-
tribution is that there is zero probability of fully revealing signals, so L (s) ∈ (0,∞) with
probability one. If trader i observes the realized signal vector s, then by Bayes’ rule the
subjective posterior belief πi satisfies
πi
1− πi
=
qi
1− qi
L (s) . (1)
Hence, L (s) is a suﬃcient statistic for the vector s.
For convenience, we normalize the aggregate endowment of assets to 1. The initial
distribution of assets over individuals is described by the cumulative distribution function
G. Thus, G (q) ∈ [0, 1] denotes the share of all assets initially held by individuals with
subjective prior belief less than or equal to q. We assume that G is continuous, and that
G is strictly increasing on the interval where G /∈ {0, 1}.10
We assume that the model (i.e., preferences, prior beliefs, and signal distributions) and
the rationality of all traders are common knowledge. This means that all traders agree on
the conditional distributions f (s|ω), even though they have heterogeneous prior beliefs.
In the terminology of Milgrom and Stokey (1982), traders have concordant beliefs.11
Discussion of Assumptions. Before proceeding, we discuss our main assumptions: het-
erogeneous priors and rational expectations equilibrium. In economics it is often assumed
that individuals have a common prior belief. We have chosen to relax this assumption for
the following two reasons:
• First, the common prior assumption is sensible when agents are dealing with com-
monly experienced events. Prediction markets deal instead with settings in which
9We do not assume that the signals are conditionally independent across traders. Indeed, a large
number of conditionally independent signals would lead to full information revelation. By allowing for
conditional dependence, our model encompasses the realistic scenario in which traders overall do not
possess full information about the outcome.
10This assumption, that the priors are continuously distributed, is made in order to simplify the analysis,
but is not essential for our underreaction result. See the discussion in footnote 15.
11Varian (1989), Harris and Raviv (1993), and Kandel and Pearson (1995) relax this assumption by
allowing traders to interpret a publicly observed signal diﬀerently. We refer to Morris (1994, 1995a)
for a characterization of the general conditions for no-trade theorems when the interpretation of new
information diﬀers across traders.
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traders are unlikely to have experienced similar events in the past. Given that in
these settings there is no commonly agreed-upon probability from the outset, it is
realistic to assume that the traders have heterogeneous prior beliefs.
• Second, the common prior assumption is not an implication of rational decision mak-
ing. An alternative approach would have been to relax the rationality assumption by
positing, for example, that the link between empirical frequencies and the subjects’
common prior is systematically flawed. Instead, we remain within the classic rational
framework and are agnostic on the link between the true empirical frequency and the
priors. We will show that whatever the true probability is, a systematic bias arises
in the market price’s response to the information when traders have heterogeneous
prior beliefs.
Another question is whether the rational expectations equilibrium is a good analytical
tool when the priors are not common. We find it plausible that individuals make some
inferences about the state from the realized price in this setting of asymmetric information.
Even though these inferences need not be as correct in reality as assumed in the REE, it
is a strength of our theory that it works under this narrow, standard assumption.12
3 Fully Revealing Rational Expectations Equilibrium
Traders are allowed to exchange assets with other traders in a competitive market. This
section characterizes the fully revealing REE in this model.13 By normalization, the prices
of the two assets sum to one, and we focus on the equilibrium determination of the price
p for the asset that pays out in event E.
Solving the choice problem of the risk-neutral traders is straightforward. Suppose
trader i has information with likelihood ratio L resulting in a posterior belief equal to πi,
and suppose that the market price is p. The subjective expected return on the asset that
pays out in event E is πi−p, while the other asset’s expected return is (1− π1)−(1− p) =
12Morris (1995b) shows that the REE concept in general relies on strong common knowledge assump-
tions. In the present setting, we are implicitly assuming that the heterogeneous prior distribution, G, is
common knowledge. Such an assumption is no stronger than the usual REE assumption that traders com-
monly know each others’ preferences, for here the subjective prior belief is just a parameter characterizing
the individual preferences.
13We focus on the necessary properties of this equilibrium, while Radner (1979) discusses the suﬃcient
conditions for its existence.
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p−πi. With the designer’s constraint on asset portfolios, individual demand thus satisfies
the following: if πi > p, trader i exchanges the entire endowment of the Ec asset into
(1− p)wi0/p units of the E asset. The final portfolio is then wi0/p units of the E asset
and 0 of the Ec asset. Conversely, when πi < p, the trader’s final portfolio is 0 of the
E asset and wi0/ (1− p) of the Ec asset. Finally, when πi = p, the trader is indiﬀerent
between any trade.
The fully revealing REE price is a suﬃcient statistic for the likelihood ratio L (s). For
every L, trader i’s demand solves this trader’s maximization problem, given belief πi (L)
satisfying (1), and given market price p (L). Market clearing requires that aggregate
net trades are zero, or that the aggregate holding of each asset equals aggregate wealth
(normalized to 1).
Proposition 1 The fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium price, p, is the unique
solution to the equation
p = 1−G
µ
p
(1− p)L+ p
¶
(2)
and is a strictly increasing function of the information realization L.
Parimutuel Interpretation. Given our focus on REE, the equilibrium is invariant with
respect to the specific rules used for market trading. To illustrate this point, we now oﬀer
a parimutuel reinterpretation of our equilibrium. Suppose that the amount Xω was bet
on outcome ω ∈ {E,Ec} in a parimutuel betting market. Every unit bet on outcome E
returns 1 + ρ units if E is true, where XE (1 + ρ) = XE +XEc = 1. The market’s implied
probability for outcome E is defined as p = XE/ (XE +XEc) = XE = 1/ (1 + ρ).
This parimutuel market has an REE which is equal to the rational expectations equi-
librium above.14 Suppose that the implied market probability is p. Again solving the
utility maximization problem of trader i, we find the following demand: trader i will bet
the amount wi0 on event E if πi > p, and bet the amount wi0 on event Ec if instead πi < p.
Note that if p is a fully revealing REE price, then market clearing implies that
XE = 1−G
µ
p
(1− p)L+ p
¶
= p
14As argued by Ottaviani and Sørensen (2005), the assumption that the market reaches an REE might
be unrealistic if traders take simultaneous positions in a parimutuel market. The final parimutuel prices
are determined on the basis of the positions taken by all traders, who do not observe those prices when
they commit to these positions. Nevertheless, we focus here on the benchmark case of REE because this
represents the most favorable scenario for information aggregation.
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from which it follows that, indeed, p = XE.
4 Underreaction to Information
Using Bayes’ rule (1), we can always interpret the price as the posterior belief of a hy-
pothetical market agent with prior belief p/ [(1− p)L+ p]. This implied “market prior”
then may be interpreted as an aggregate of the heterogeneous subjective prior beliefs. Our
main result is that this aggregate market belief depends in a systematic fashion on the
pre-trade information. This means that the aggregation of beliefs cannot be separated
from the market’s ability to aggregate information.
Proposition 2 If beliefs are truly heterogeneous, i.e. qi 6= qj for some pair of traders,
then the market prior
p
(1− p)L+ p
is strictly decreasing in L.
The arrival of more favorable pre-trade information yields a higher market price that
nevertheless underreacts to the information. Consider the inference of the market designer
or of an outside observer who desires to extract information from the market price. Given
any fixed prior belief q of this observer, the posterior probability π (L) for the event E
given revealed information L satisfies (1), or
log
µ
π (L)
1− π (L)
¶
= log
µ
q
1− q
¶
+ logL. (3)
The expression on the left hand side is the posterior log-likelihood ratio for event E. It
moves one-to-one with changes in logL. Proposition 2 implies that the observer’s belief
reacts more than the price:
Proposition 3 If beliefs are truly heterogeneous, then for any two diﬀerent information
realizations L > L0,
log
µ
π (L)
1− π (L)
¶
− log
µ
π (L0)
1− π (L0)
¶
> log
µ
p (L)
1− p (L)
¶
− log
µ
p (L0)
1− p (L0)
¶
> 0. (4)
To understand the intuition for this underreaction result, consider what happens when
the traders have information more favorable to event E (corresponding, say, to the Demo-
cratic candidate winning the election), i.e., when L is higher. According to (2), the price
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of the E asset, p, is clearly higher when L is higher. Now, this means that traders who are
optimistic about a Democratic victory can buy fewer units of asset E, because the bound
wi0/p is decreasing in p. On the other hand, traders who are pessimistic about a Demo-
cratic victory can buy more units of asset Ec, which they want to buy. If all the traders
who were purchasing E before the increase in L were still purchasing E at the higher price
that results with higher L, there would be insuﬃcient demand for E. Similarly, there
would also be excess demand for Ec. To balance the market it is necessary that some
traders who were betting on the Republican candidate before now change sides and put
their money on the Democratic candidate. In the new equilibrium, the price must change
to move traders from the pessimistic to the optimistic side. Thus, the indiﬀerent trader
who determines the equilibrium price is someone with a more pessimistic prior belief about
Democratic victory. Hence, although the price p rises with the information L, it rises more
slowly than a posterior belief, because of this negative eﬀect on the market prior.15
The underreaction result derived in this section is driven by the institutional restriction
on the amount of money invested (see footnote 7) and, therefore, on the number of assets
a trader can sell. In turn, this restriction imposes a bound on the number of assets that
each individual can purchase and eventually hold. The result hinges on the fact that this
bound (equal to wi0/p) is inversely related to the equilibrium price.16
Proposition 3 oﬀers a new informational explanation of the favorite-longshot bias, a fact
that is widely documented in the empirical literature on betting markets (see Thaler and
Ziemba, 1988, and Snowberg and Wolfers, 2005).17 The bias says that outcomes favored
by the market occur more often than if the market price is interpreted as a probability,
15Our assumption that prior beliefs are distributed continuously in the population is not essential for
the result. If the population is finite, or there are gaps in the distribution, then there can be ranges
of information, L, over which the equilibrium price is constant. In that case, the rational expectations
equilibrium cannot fully reveal L, but can reveal the information needed for the proper allocation of
the assets. Underreaction would still hold, but only relative to the limited information revealed by the
equilibrium price.
16Suppose, instead, that the market designer were to impose a direct cap on the number of assets
that each trader can buy, rather than on the budget each trader can invest. Then, for a large range of
information realizations, the same fixed set of optimists (or pessimists) would buy the full allowance of the
E (or Ec) asset. Since the sets of optimists and pessimists are constant, there would be no underreaction.
However, typically in prediction markets there is an upper bound on the traders’ budget, rather than on
the number of nominal positions they can take.
17In Ottaviani and Sørensen (2005), we explore a fundamentally diﬀerent explanation of the favorite-
longshot bias in parimutuel betting. There, we explicitly assume that simultaneous betting prohibits
the adjustment of market odds to the REE. The bias in that paper is generated by the fact that the
information revealed in a Bayes-Nash equilibrium is not fully incorporated in the final prices.
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and conversely, longshots win less frequently than suggested by the market price. To see
how this eﬀect arises in our context, consider again an outside observer of the market with
fixed prior belief q.
Proposition 4 If beliefs are truly heterogeneous, there exists a market price p∗ ∈ [0, 1]
with the property that p (L) > p∗ implies π (L) > p (L), and p (L) < p∗ implies π (L) <
p (L).
There is a threshold level, p∗, for the realized market price, such that a market price
below p∗ classifies event E as a longshot and a market price above p∗ makes E a favorite.
The observer expects longshots to occur less often than indicated by the market price, and
favorites to occur more often.
Example. Suppose that the distribution of subjective prior beliefs over the interval [0, 1]
is G (q) = qβ/
h
qβ + (1− q)β
i
, where β > 0 is a parameter that measures the concentration
of beliefs. The greater is β, the less spread (according to Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1970)
is this symmetric belief distribution around the average belief q = 1/2. For β = 1 beliefs
are uniformly distributed, as β →∞ beliefs become concentrated near 1/2, and as β → 0
beliefs are maximally dispersed around the extremes of [0, 1]. The equilibrium condition (2)
becomes
log
µ
p
1− p
¶
= log
⎛
⎝
1−G
³
p
(1−p)L+p
´
G
³
p
(1−p)L+p
´
⎞
⎠ = β log
µ
(1− p)L
p
¶
,
so that the market price p (L) satisfies the linear relation
log
µ
p (L)
1− p (L)
¶
=
β
1 + β
logL.
Hence, β/ (1 + β) ∈ (0, 1) measures the extent to which the price reacts to information.
Price underreaction is minimal when β is very large, corresponding to the case with nearly
homogeneous beliefs. Conversely, there is an arbitrarily large degree of underreaction when
beliefs are maximally heterogeneous (i.e. β is close to zero).
Assume that a market observer’s prior is q = 1/2 for event E, consistent with a
symmetric market price of p (1) = 1/2 in the absence of additional information. The
posterior belief associated with price p then satisfies
log
µ
π (L)
1− π (L)
¶
= logL =
1 + β
β
log
µ
p (L)
1− p (L)
¶
.
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Figure 1: This plot shows the posterior probability for event E as a function of the market
price p for the E asset, when the prior beliefs of the risk-neutral traders are uniformly
distributed (β = 1 in the example). The dotted line is the diagonal.
As illustrated in Figure 1 for the case with uniform beliefs (β = 1), the market price
overstates the winning chance of a longshot and understates the winning chance of a
favorite by a factor of two.
5 Risk Aversion
So far we have assumed that each individual trader is risk neutral, and thus ends up
taking as extreme a position as possible on either side of the market. Now, we show that
our result extends nicely to risk averse individuals, under the plausible assumption that
traders’ absolute risk aversion is decreasing in wealth, even when no exogenous bounds are
imposed on the amounts that traders can invest.
Model. Realistically, suppose that each trader is endowed with the same number w0 of
each asset. To properly capture the eﬀect of risk aversion, we suppose that each trader i is
also characterized by an initial, state-independent level Wi of additional wealth.18 Trader
i maximizes subjective expected utility of final wealth, πiui (wi (E))+(1− πi)ui (wi (Ec)),
18See Musto and Yilmaz (2003) for a model in which, instead, traders are subject to wealth risk, because
they are diﬀerentially aﬀected by the redistribution associated with diﬀerent electoral outcomes.
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where πi is the trader’s subjective belief. We suppose that ui is twice diﬀerentiable with
u0i > 0 and u00i < 0, and satisfies the DARA assumption that the Arrow-Pratt coeﬃcient
of absolute risk aversion, −u00i /u0i, is weakly decreasing in wealth, wi. The cumulative
distribution function G again describes the distribution of subjective beliefs, and it is
assumed to satisfy the same properties as before. Private information is distributed as
before.
Let ∆xi denote the choice variable of trader i, such that p∆xi units of the Ec asset are
exchanged for (1− p)∆xi units of the E asset. Note that this is a zero net value trade,
since the asset sale generates (1− p) p |∆xi| of cash that is spent on buying the other asset.
The final wealth levels in the two states are
wi (E) =Wi + w0 + (1− p)∆xi (5)
and
wi (Ec) =Wi + w0 − p∆xi. (6)
The trading constraints translate into the requirement that ∆xi ∈ [−w0/ (1− p) , w0/p].
Equilibrium. Given price p and posterior belief πi, trader i chooses ∆xi to maximize
posterior expected utility πiui (wi (E)) + (1− πi)ui (wi (Ec)). If the trading constraints
are not binding, then the choice satisfies the necessary first-order condition
πi
1− πi
u0i (wi (E))
u0i (wi (Ec))
=
p
1− p. (7)
The endogenously determined net trade ∆xi then satisfies the standard condition that the
marginal rate of substitution equals the price ratio. In particular, a trader with πi = p
will choose wi (E) = wi (Ec), corresponding to ∆xi = 0. A trader with a posterior belief
πi above the price p will choose ∆xi > 0. Note that the trading constraint does not bind,
unless the trader is nearly risk neutral or the diﬀerence between πi and p is suﬃciently
large. In analogy with Proposition 1 we have:
Proposition 5 There exists a unique fully-revealing rational expectations equilibrium.
The price, p, is a strictly increasing function of the information realization L.
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Belief Aggregation with CARA. Suppose first that the traders have constant ab-
solute risk aversion (CARA) utility functions, with heterogeneous degrees of risk aversion,
such that ui (w) = − exp (−w/ti), where ti > 0 is the constant coeﬃcient of risk tolerance,
the inverse of the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion. Denoting the relative risk tolerance
of trader i in the population by τ i = ti/
R 1
0
tjdG (qj), we have:
Proposition 6 Suppose that the traders have CARA preferences and heterogeneous be-
liefs. Define an average prior belief q by
log
q
1− q =
Z 1
0
τ i log
qi
1− qi
dG (qi) ,
and for each individual let
d∗i = ti log
µ
qi − qqi
q − qqi
¶
. (8)
Suppose that 1+w0/ infi d∗i < w0/ supi d∗i . When the realized information L is in the range
satisfying
1 +
w0
infi d∗i
≤ qL
qL+ 1− q ≤
w0
supi d∗i
(9)
then the fully-revealing REE price satisfies Bayes’ rule with market prior q, i.e., p (L) =
qL/ (qL+ 1− q). When L falls outside this range, the price underreacts to changes in L
compared to Bayes’ rule.
Risk aversion allows for the possibility that no trader meets the constraint. This
is more likely to happen when w0 is large, as also suggested by condition (9). With
CARA preferences and when no trader is constrained, trader i chooses net demand d∗i in
equilibrium. The market price thus behaves as a posterior belief and there is no bias.
This result for the case with CARA preferences and unconstrained positions is consis-
tent with Varian’s (1989) analysis. As shown by Wilson (1968), under CARA preferences
the traders’ heterogeneous priors can be aggregated. Once private information is added,
the price then behaves as a posterior belief.
Underreaction with DARA. We have seen that CARA preferences lead to an unbiased
price reaction to information when the trading constraints are not binding in equilibrium.
Now we verify that, for strictly DARA preferences, a bias arises in the price whether
traders are constrained or not. When L rises, the rising equilibrium price yields a negative
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Figure 2: In the example with uniformly distributed risk-averse traders, this plot shows
the posterior chance for event E as a function of the E-asset’s market price p. The dotted
line is the diagonal.
wealth eﬀect on any optimistic individual (with πi > p) who is a net demander (∆xi > 0).
Conversely, pessimistic traders benefit from the price increase. With DARA preferences,
the wealth eﬀect implies that optimists become more risk averse while pessimists become
less risk averse. An increase in L thus must shift weight from optimists to pessimists when
the market price is calculated as a belief average. Hence, although the price rises with L,
it rises less fast than a posterior belief, because the weight is shifted more to pessimists
when information is more favorable.
Proposition 7 Suppose that beliefs are truly heterogeneous and that all individuals have
strictly decreasing absolute risk aversion. Then the market price underreacts to informa-
tion, as for any L 6= L0,¯¯¯¯
log
µ
π (L)
1− π (L)
¶
− log
µ
π (L0)
1− π (L0)
¶¯¯¯¯
>
¯¯¯¯
log
µ
p (L)
1− p (L)
¶
− log
µ
p (L0)
1− p (L0)
¶¯¯¯¯
.
Appendix B provides a graphical illustration of this result for an economy with two
types of traders and no exogenous bounds on the wealth traders can invest.
Example. Suppose that prior beliefs are uniformly distributed over the interval [0, 1],
with G (q) = q, and traders have logarithmic preferences, ui (w) = logw, satisfying the
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DARA assumption. In order to highlight the diﬀerence between Propositions 3 and 7,
namely the inclusion of individuals with an interior solution to their maximization problem,
we again remove completely the exogenous bound on the wealth invested. The individual
demand function solving (7) is ∆xi = (Wi + w0) (πi − p) / [p (1− p)]. The equilibrium
price is then an average of the posterior beliefs,
p (L) =
Z 1
0
π (L) dq =
Z 1
0
qL
qL+ (1− q) dq. (10)
For L 6= 1, integration by parts of (10) yields p (L) = L (L− 1− logL) / (L− 1)2. If
we keep fixed p (1) =
R 1
0
q dq = 1/2 as the prior belief of the outside observer, Figure 2
illustrates the favorite-longshot bias.
6 Contribution to Literature
This paper bridges the gap between the literature on betting with heterogenous beliefs and
the literature on REE. In an influential paper on parimutuel betting, Ali (1977) formu-
lates a static model in which risk-neutral bettors with limited wealth have heterogenous
beliefs about a binary outcome. He shows that if the bettor with the median belief thinks
that one outcome (defined to be the favorite) is more likely, then the equilibrium fraction
of parimutuel bets on this outcome will be lower than the belief of the median bettor.
By identifying the belief of the median bettor as the correct benchmark for the empiri-
cal probability, Ali concludes that the favorite is underbet as compared to the longshot.
Following Ali, the fledgling literature on belief aggregation in prediction markets (Manski,
2006, Gjerstad, 2005, and Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2005) analyzes the relation between the
equilibrium price and the average belief of traders, depending on the traders’ preferences
for risk. In this literature, traders do not make any inference from market prices.
A key ingredient of Ali’s explanation for the favorite-longshot bias is the assumption
that the belief of the median bettor corresponds to the empirical probability. But if the
traders’ beliefs really have information content (about the empirical probability of the
state), then their positions should depend on the information about these beliefs that is
contained in the market price. This question underlies the rational expectations critique
of the Walrasian approach to price formation with heterogeneous beliefs (see e.g. the
discussion in Chapter 1 of Grossman, 1989).
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The REE literature typically assumes that traders have a common prior belief, so
that diﬀerences in beliefs across agents only can be attributed to private information.
In the context of prediction markets in which there is no liquidity motive for trade, the
REE price therefore reveals (a suﬃcient statistic of) all the information possessed by
the traders (Grossman, 1976). After the market opens, the posterior beliefs of all traders
would become identical if traders had a common prior–and because the original allocation
is Pareto optimal there would be no active trading in equilibrium (Milgrom and Stokey,
1982).
In this paper, we retain the REE assumption of private information and informational
inference from prices, but depart from the common prior assumption. Traders have dif-
ferent priors and they trade actively on the basis of those beliefs, as in the literature on
prediction markets. But, unlike the prediction market literature, here we do not base our
explanation of the favorite-longshot bias on how the equilibrium price relates to a summary
statistic of the traders’ beliefs. Instead, we conduct our comparative statics exercise with
respect to the information that is revealed in the market, holding constant the distribution
of the prior beliefs. Our results indicate that the appropriate method for averaging prior
beliefs interacts with the realized information.
While the literature on the no-trade theorem focuses on the eﬀect that the arrival of
new private information has on an initial equilibrium allocation, we characterize here the
REE that results when privately informed traders with heterogeneous priors are asked to
trade once. This market-opening scenario is particularly relevant for prediction markets,
which are often created with the express purpose of aggregating information and beliefs
already held by the traders. Therefore our contribution to the REE literature is the
characterization of the interaction of heterogeneous beliefs and information in the first
round of trade. Our analysis complements Milgrom and Stokey (1982), who focus instead
on the second round of trade that follows the arrival of new information.
Following Miller (1977) and Harrison and Kreps (1978), there is an extensive literature
in which there is active trade based on heterogeneous prior beliefs.19 Our model departs
from this finance literature in two key ways. First, risk-neutral traders are not wealth-
constrained in Harrison and Kreps (1978), but the market is incomplete, so that traders
can take positions on only one side of the market. Thus in their model, the entire net
19See also Morris (1996) and Scheinkman and Xiong’s (2004) survey.
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supply of the asset is held by the most optimistic trader, whose belief determines the
market price. This trader’s belief then can be taken as the market belief, so there is no
informational favorite-longshot bias. In our model, markets instead are complete, but
the wealth that can be invested is constrained, as is natural in the context of prediction
markets. Second, traders do not have private information in most of this literature, with
the exception of the models discussed in the next two paragraphs.20
A handful of papers on betting study the interaction of private information with het-
erogeneous priors. Notably, Shin (1991 and 1992) considers asset pricing by an uninformed
monopolist bookmaker in a market in which some traders take positions on the basis of
their beliefs while others are perfectly informed about the outcome. Morris (1997) char-
acterizes the equilibrium in a game-theoretic model of bilateral betting with asymmetric
information and heterogeneous priors. As in these contributions, in our model hetero-
geneous beliefs coexist with private information, but we focus here on the competitive
equilibrium.
As already discussed in the introduction, we follow Milgrom and Stokey (1982) and
Varian (1989) by allowing for the coexistence of private information with heterogeneous
priors. We add to Milgrom and Stokey (1982) the characterization of how equilibrium
prices react to changes in information in the first round of trade. Our underreaction result
crucially depends on wealth eﬀects, which are absent when traders’ positions are not
exogenously bounded or when traders have CARA preferences, as in Varian (1989).
7 Conclusion
Prediction markets are special financial markets in which traders’ endowments are constant
with respect to diﬀerent outcome realizations. Our model of these markets has three key
ingredients: heterogeneous priors, private information, and limited positions. First, market
participants do not share a common prior belief because there is genuine uncertainty about
the underlying event. Second, the market designer typically is interested in aggregating
the private information of the participants–so it is natural to allow for the presence of
this information. Third, prediction market traders are allowed to wager only a limited
amount of wealth, so their positions are bounded. The three ingredients of our model
20On the optimal allocation of risk with heterogenous prior beliefs and risk preferences but without
private information, see Wilson’s (1968) classic contribution and the recent developments by Gollier (2006).
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are inspired by the special features of prediction markets, but are also relevant for more
general financial markets, as Hong and Stein (forthcoming) argue.
In this setting, the REE price reveals all the traders’ private information, but under-
reacts to information. Our result is driven by a wealth eﬀect arising because traders with
heterogeneous beliefs take speculative net positions. More generally, according to Propo-
sition 7, underreaction holds under the realistic assumption of decreasing absolute risk
aversion preferences, without the need to impose exogenous bounds on positions.
We conclude by discussing three extensions of the model. First, what happens with
more than two states? By focusing on markets for a binary event we have managed to
characterize the reaction of REE prices to information for general risk preferences. In
contrast, since Grossman (1976) most of REE literature obtain positive characterizations of
equilibrium prices by restricting attention to CARA preferences and normally distributed
returns. With more than two states and heterogeneous priors, wealth eﬀects introduce
an additional channel through which information aﬀects prices. As a result, information
about the likelihood of a state relative to a second state can impact the price of the asset
for a third state. The adjustment related by this contagion eﬀect can induce overreaction
to information in the relative prices of the assets for the first two states.
Second, our results have interesting implications for price dynamics, in a multi-period
trading environment with sequential arrival of information à la Milgrom and Stokey (1982).
In current research, we show that the combination of heterogeneous priors with wealth
eﬀects yields a simple mechanism for price momentum: price changes are positively cor-
related with the opening price. Intuitively, the first round’s information is swamped by
the information revealed in subsequent rounds, and hence over time the price comes to
approximate the correctly updated prior belief. Thus, the initial underreaction must be
followed by a correcting price momentum.
Finally, we are currently investigating the more general implications of our underreac-
tion result with risk averse traders and unconstrained positions, in the context of broader
financial markets in which idiosyncratic uncertainty generates gains from trade. Extending
Rubinstein’s (1974) results to allow for private information, it can be shown that there is
no underreaction bias when traders have common prior but heterogeneous endowments,
provided they have hyperbolic absolute risk aversion with common cautiousness parame-
ters. For example, if all traders have logarithmic preferences (our leading DARA example
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analyzed in Section 5) the price behaves as a posterior belief when traders have hetero-
geneous endowments, but common prior. Intuitively, all liquidity-motivated traders take
more (or less) extreme positions, as the available information varies. With heterogeneous
beliefs, instead, optimists (who buy) buy less on favorable information, while pessimists
(who sell) sell more, so that the price must equilibrate in a direction contrary to informa-
tion. Thus, heterogeneity of priors is important for underreaction and cannot be replaced
by heterogeneity in endowments across individuals.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. For a given likelihood ratio L, the prior of an individual with
posterior belief πi is, using (1), qi = πi/ [(1− πi)L+ πi]. The Ec asset is demanded in
amount wi0/ (1− p) by every individual with πi < p, or equivalently qi < p/ [(1− p)L+ p].
The aggregate demand for this asset is then G (p/ [(1− p)L+ p]) / (1− p). In equilibrium,
this aggregate demand is equalized to the aggregate supply, equal to 1, resulting in equa-
tion (2).
We complete the proof by noting that the price defined by (2) reveals L, because it
is a strictly increasing function of L. The left-hand side of (2) is a strictly increasing
continuous function of p, which is 0 when p = 0 and 1 when p = 1. For any L ∈ (0,∞),
the right-hand side is a weakly decreasing continuous function of p, for the cumulative
distribution function G is non-decreasing. The right-hand side is equal to 1 at p = 0,
while it is 0 at p = 1. Thus, there exists a unique solution, such that G /∈ {0, 1}. When
L rises, the left-hand side is unaﬀected, while the right-hand side rises for any p, strictly
so near the solution to (2) by the assumptions on G. Hence, the solution p must rise with
L. ¤
Proof of Proposition 2. The market price p is the posterior belief given information L
and market prior belief p/ [(1− p)L+ p]. When L increases, so does p. By equation (2),
when p increases, p/ [(1− p)L+ p] must fall, because the cumulative distribution function
G is non-decreasing. ¤
Proof of Proposition 3. By Proposition 1, p (L) > p (L0). By (3), (4) is equivalent to
log
µ
p (L)
1− p (L)
¶
− log
µ
p (L0)
1− p (L0)
¶
< logL− logL0,
or
p(L)
1−p(L)
1
L
< p(L
0)
1−p(L0)
1
L0
.
Using the strictly increasing transformation z → z/ (1 + z) on both sides of this inequality,
it is equivalent to
p (L)
[1− p (L)]L+ p (L) <
p (L0)
[1− p (L0)]L0 + p (L0) ,
which is true by Proposition 2. ¤
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Proof of Proposition 4. By Proposition 3, the function
Ψ (L) = log
µ
π (L)
1− π (L)
¶
− log
µ
p (L)
1− p (L)
¶
is strictly increasing in L. Hence, one of the following three cases will hold. In the first
case, there exists an L∗ ∈ (0,∞) such that Ψ (L) is negative for L < L∗ and positive for
L > L∗ – in this case, the result follows with p∗ = p (L∗). In the second case, Ψ (L) is
negative for all L, and the result holds for p∗ = 1. In the third case, Ψ (L) is positive for
all L, and the result is true with p∗ = 0. ¤
Proof of Proposition 5. The individual trader solves the problem
max
∆xi∈[−w0/(1−p),w0/p]
πiui (wi (E)) + (1− πi)ui (wi (Ec)) .
Strict concavity of ui ensures that the maximand ∆xi is unique. By the Theorem of
the Maximum, ∆xi is a continuous function of πi and p. We first show that the op-
timizer ∆xi is strictly decreasing in p and weakly increasing in πi, strictly so when
∆xi ∈ (−w0/ (1− p) , w0/p).
The constraint set [−w0/ (1− p) , w0/p] does not depend on πi and falls in Veinott’s
set order when p rises. The trader’s objective function πiui (Wi + w0 + (1− p)∆xi) +
(1− πi)ui (Wi + w0 − p∆xi) has first derivative
πi (1− p)u0i (wi (E))− (1− πi) pui (wi (Ec))
with respect to ∆xi. Since u0i > 0, the cross-partial of the objective with respect to the
choice variable ∆xi and the exogenous πi is strictly positive, and hence ∆xi is weakly
increasing in πi, strictly so when the unique ∆xi optimizer satisfies (7). A suﬃcient
condition for a strictly negative cross-partial with respect to ∆xi and p is
∆xi [πi (1− p)u00i (wi (E))− (1− πi) pu00i (wi (Ec))] > 0. (11)
Using the first order condition for optimality, the second factor of (11) is positive if and
only if
−u
00
i (wi (Ec))
u0i (wi (Ec))
> −u
00
i (wi (E))
u0i (wi (E))
.
By the DARA assumption, this inequality holds if and only if wi (E) > wi (Ec), i.e.,
∆xi > 0. Hence the cross-partial is strictly negative, and it follows that ∆xi is strictly
decreasing in p.
22
Equilibrium is characterized by the requirement that the aggregate purchase of asset
E must be zero, i.e.,
R 1
0
∆xi (p, qi, L) dG (qi) = 0. When p = 0, every trader has πi > p
and hence ∆xi > 0, while the opposite relation holds when p = 1. Individual demands are
continuous and strictly decreasing in p, so there exists a unique equilibrium price in (0, 1).
When L is increased, πi (L) rises, and hence ∆xi rises for every trader. The price must
then be strictly increased, in order to restore equilibrium. Finally, since the equilibrating
price p is thus a strictly increasing function of L, the equilibrium price schedule is fully
revealing. ¤
Proof of Proposition 6. Suppose for a moment that no trader is constrained in equilib-
rium. The necessary and suﬃcient first order condition (7) for the unconstrained optimum
is solved by
∆xi = ti log
µ
1− p (L)
p (L)
πi (L)
1− πi (L)
¶
. (12)
Market clearing occurs when
R 1
0
∆xidG (qi) = 0. By (12) and using πi (L) / (1− πi (L)) =
qiL/ (1− qi) this is solved by p (L) = qL/ (qL+ 1− q). Inserting this market price in
the individual demand (12), the resulting equilibrium demand is d∗i , as given in (8). This
analysis describes the equilibrium, provided no individual is constrained. The lower bound
constrains no individual when 0 > infi d∗i ≥ −w0/ (1− p (L)), or equivalently p (L) ≥
1 + w0/ infi d∗i . Likewise, the upper bound is equivalent to p (L) ≤ w0/ supi d∗i .
When a positive mass of traders are constrained, the bias follows from the argument
of Proposition 7 reported below. ¤
Proof of Proposition 7. The result follows as in the proof of Proposition 3, once
we establish that log [p (L) / (1− p (L))] − log (L) is strictly decreasing in L. Suppose,
for a contradiction, that log [p (L) / (1− p (L))] − log (L) is non-decreasing near some L.
Traders at the boundary ∆xi = −w0/ (1− p) have their demand decreasing in p, and
hence d∆xi/dL < 0. Likewise, d∆xi/dL < 0 at the other boundary ∆xi = w0/p. We
will show that the same eﬀect holds for traders satisfying (7). Since market clearingR 1
0
∆xi (p (L) , qi, L) dG (qi) = 0 implies
R 1
0
d∆xi (p, qi, L) /dLdG (qi) = 0, we will then have
a contradiction.
Since log[πi(L)/(1−πi (L))]−log (L) is constant, (7) implies that u0i (wi(E)) /u0i (wi(Ec))
is non-decreasing in L. Using the expressions for the final wealth levels (5) and (6), non-
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negativity of the derivative of u0i (wi (E)) /u0i (wi (Ec)) implies that
u00i (wi(E))u
0
i (wi(E
c))
£
(1− p) d∆xidL −∆xi
dp
dL
¤
≥ −u00i (wi(Ec))u0i (wi(E))
£
pd∆xidL +∆xi
dp
dL
¤
.
The second derivative of the utility function is negative, so this implies
d∆xi
dL
≤ ∆xi
dp
dL
u00i (wi (E))u0i (wi (Ec))− u00i (wi (Ec))u0i (wi (E))
(1− p)u00i (wi (E))u0i (wi (Ec)) + pu00i (wi (Ec))u0i (wi (E))
. (13)
On the right-hand side of (13), dp/dL > 0 by Proposition 5, and the denominator is
negative. Recall that ∆xi > 0 if and only if wi (E) > wi (Ec). By DARA, this implies that
−u
00
i (wi (E))
u0i (wi (E))
< −u
00
i (wi (Ec))
u0i (wi (Ec))
or that the numerator is positive. Likewise, when ∆xi < 0, the numerator is negative. In
either case, the right-hand side of (13) is strictly negative. Hence, d∆xi/dL < 0 for every
trader who satisfies the first-order condition (7). ¤
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Appendix B: Edgeworth Box Illustration
We now illustrate the logic of Proposition 7 for an economy with two types of traders,
with prior beliefs q1 < q2. As represented in Figure 3, the Edgeworth box is a square
because there is no aggregate uncertainty. The initial endowment, e, lies on the diagonal,
being the same in the two events: wi (E) =Wi + w0 = wi (Ec).
The strictly risk averse traders have strictly convex indiﬀerence curves (not drawn to
avoid cluttering the picture). The slope of the indiﬀerence curves at any safe allocation is
−πi/ (1− πi) = −qiL/ (1− qi). Thus, for any allocation along the diagonal, the indiﬀer-
ence curve of trader 2 (optimist) is steeper than that of trader 1 (pessimist).
We focus on interior equilibria in which the exogenous trading constraints are not
binding. When information L is available and revealed, the marginal rates of substitution
of the two traders are equalized at the equilibrium allocation, w∗. Thus, the equilibrium
allocation must lie above the diagonal, so that the optimistic trader 2 is a net buyer of the
E asset.
How is the equilibrium aﬀected by an exogenous change in information to L0 > L? As a
result of this change in information, indiﬀerence curves become steeper by a factor of L0/L.
For the sake of argument, suppose that the price were to change without any underreaction
from the original p (L) to the Bayes-updated p0 = p (L)L0/ (p (L)L0 + (1− p (L))L). At
allocation w∗, the marginal rates of substitutions are still equalized, and the straight line
dividing the two traders’ preferred sets has slope −p0/ (1− p0). However, since p0 > p,
this straight line passes through the diagonal below the initial endowment point, proving
that w∗ cannot be the new equilibrium allocation. Maintaining price p0, the new budget
line must pass through the initial endowment. As this new budget line is further up on
the diagonal compared to the one passing through w∗, we see illustrated here the positive
wealth eﬀect for the pessimistic trader 1 and the negative wealth eﬀect for the optimistic
trader 2.
We now turn to the implication of this wealth eﬀect. Given price p0, the choice w∗1
would be optimal for trader 1, if the true budget line were passing through w∗. This
point lies above the diagonal in the Edgeworth box. Now, as it is well known since Arrow
(1965), DARA implies that the wealth expansion paths diverge from the diagonal. The
richer trader 1 demands a riskier bundle (further away from the diagonal) by increasing
w1 (Ec) − w1 (E), whereas the poorer trader 2 demands a safer bundle (closer to the
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Figure 3: Edgeworth box representation of the underreaction result for the case with
DARA preferences and interior solution. The wealth expansion paths are linear for the
special case with logarithmic preferences.
diagonal) by decreasing w2 (E) − w2 (Ec).21 Therefore p0 cannot be an equilibrium after
the exogenous information change. To reach an equilibrium both traders must shift their
portfolio towards lower wi (Ec)−wi (E) so as to eliminate the excess demand for asset Ec
as well as the excess supply for asset E. This is achieved by a relative reduction in the
price for asset E, so that p (L0) < p0. Thus, prices must underreact to information.
21The trader’s choice problem can be reformulated with a safe asset, always paying 1, and a risky
asset paying 1 in Ec and −1 in E. The richer trader demands more units of the risky asset, and hence
|w (Ec)− w (E)| rises.
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